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INTRODUCTION 
Lynda L. Butler, Chancellor Professor of Law and Director, Property 
Rights Project, William & Mary Law School 
BUTLER. Good morning. Welcome to the Fourteenth Annual Brigham-
Kanner Property Rights Conference. We are going to begin our first 
panel by focusing on the work of David Callies, our recipient of the 
Brigham -Kanner Prize. We will use his scholarship as a springboard 
to discuss issues concerning the future ofland use regulation. David 
will speak first, and then each panelist will speak for about fifteen 
minutes. At the end, we will have about fifteen minutes for questions 
and answers. Panelists, if you see me waving, that means it's time 
to move on so the next person has time. Now let's welcome David. 
CALLIES. I understand I have about an hour and a quarter to speak, 
so relax-that's class time in Hawai'i, which is what I'm used to 
speaking at. 
I want to reserve two minutes for rebuttal just in case my col-
leagues take the opportunity to say something they think I'm not 
going to be able to respond to; I'll do my best. 
Thank you all for coming. I thank the William & Mary Law School, 
Lynda Butler, and everybody for the invitation and for the wonder-
ful award last night. It was a wonderful evening for me, and I hope 
everyone else enjoyed it as well. 
I have spent a lot of time in the area of regulatory takings, almost 
accidentally. This, of course, is the odd sort of theory that Justice 
Holmes sprung on the legal world in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 1 
Before that case, eminent domain and physical takings were pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment and were never connected to the 
1. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
11 
12 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 7:011 
exercise of police power. And after that, the theory of regulatory 
takings was born. 
The Supreme Court then abandoned the field for about fifty years, 
leading my former partner, the late Fred Bosselman, and I to write 
something with a gentleman named John Banta called The Taking 
Issue. 2 At that time, I was representing mainly governmental inter-
ests, and the truth of the matter was that since the Supreme Court 
hadn't said anything about regulatory takings in fifty years, we had 
a suggestion: Let's do away with regulatory takings. The Supreme 
Court hasn't said anything about it, so why don't we just do away 
with it? 
Well, of course, the Supreme Court did say something thereaf-
ter-in a sort of ridiculous April Fools' decision that dealt with a 
bunch of students who were turfing the area around their residence 
and with the city that passed an ordinance that provided no more 
than three people, unrelated by blood or marriage, could live in the 
same house. 3 That provoked a sort of odd decision on April Fools' 
Day, and everybody thought it was very appropriate that this deci-
sion came down then, because it was very foolish. The Supreme 
Court then went on from that case to decide a trilogy of cases: lots 
of things about regulatory takings, total takings under Lucas,4 partial 
takings under Penn Central,5 and then land-development conditions 
in the cases that came after.6 So we do have regulatory takings. It's 
a matter of its reach and what it does. 
I would like to share a quick anecdote. My former partner, Fred 
Bosselman, was invited to Harvard to speak. By the way, The Taking 
Issue got its name because John Banta and I could not come up with 
a name after two days, despite the fact that Fred Bosselman was 
asking us to. So he said, "Okay, I'll fix you guys. It's going to be 'The 
Taking Issue.'" And there we have it. 
So, Fred shows up on campus to give his lecture at Harvard. The 
posters read that the famous alum Fred Bosselman was coming back 
2. See generally FRED P. BOSSELMAN, DAVID L. CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, COUNCIL ON 
ENVTL. QUALITY, THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND 
USE CONTROL (1973). 
3. See Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
4. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
5. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
6. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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to give a speech, and listed the title of his book. The book was sort 
of reddish and tannish, and "The Taking Issue" was in modest print 
at the bottom of the front cover. The Constitution was prominently 
displayed on the front of that cover, commencing as it does, in very 
large script, "We the People of the United States." So all the posters 
read that everyone should come and see the wonderful lecture by 
Fred Bosselman, author of 'We the People." You think people know 
what you're going to talk about, and then out it comes. And people 
really have no idea, and it's not all that important. 
So, to some extent, that's why I'm here. I hope it's at least reason-
ably articulate this morning. 
I have a couple of remarks. A number of years ago I took the lib-
erty-having been in the law business at that point close to fifty years 
(now, it's an even fifty years)-I suggested ten things were going to 
happen with respect to takings 7 : 
(1) I said that land development conditions would continue to 
come under even more scrutiny for nexus and proportional-
ity. Then we had the City of San Jose case from California,s 
where the Court does not seem to appreciate the difference 
between regulation of land use and rules that make land-
owners produce something. Then Koontz came along. 9 So 
we certainly do have more security about land develop-
ment conditions. 
(2) Of course, we'll continued to be confused by the difference 
between legislative and administrative/quasi-judicial ex-
actions.lO The court still hasn't dealt with that, and it's 
probably one of the last unresolved issues in the regula-
tory taking area. 
(3) There will be more use of consensual tools like development 
agreements.ll It's happening in California, but it's not hap-
pening in a whole lot of other places. There are hundreds 
7. David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use Takings 
Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 44 (2014) [hereinafter Callies, Through a Glass]. 
8. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016). 
9. Koontz v. St. John's River Water Mgmt., 570 U.S. 595 (2013). 
10. Callies, Through a Glass, supra note 7, at 44. 
11. [d. at 45. 
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and hundreds of agreements (as Mike Berger will confirm, 
I'm sure) with respect to communities getting together 
with commercial enterprises and developers, and working 
on development agreements. Hawai'i has had a statute like 
California's in place for thirty-five years, and so far we've 
had two development agreements. So, as Larry Tribe once 
observed, those of us that use crystal balls may have to get 
used to eating ground glass.12 
(4) The Supreme Court continues to reexamine its decisions 
with respect to Kelo. 13 That hasn't happened either. We 
haven't had a recent eminent domain case, and I thought 
there would be at least one coming up. 
(5) The courts will continue to wrestle with exceptions to per 
se government takings, and the public trust doctrine will 
be an issue. 14 That's coming up more and more as excep-
tions to Lucas, safe havens for total takings under Lucas. 15 
(6) If a government is passing a regulation that is essentially 
abating a nuisance or has got to do with the background 
principles of common law property, custom and the public 
trust doctrine seem to be safe havens for government 
when it enacts a total-taking regulation. 16 And the public 
trust threatens to do a lot that way. In Hawai'i we have a 
pending case where the argument is that the summit of a 
mountain is subject to the public trust doctrine.17 It's the 
farthest out attempt to recognize how far the public trust 
doctrine can be extended. Our Supreme Court will be 
dealing with that in the next year, and lots of folks are 
watching it outside of Hawai'i. 
(7) The Court will cut back the application of the ripeness 
rule. IS That's been happening in many circuits around the 
12. Tribe: As U.S. Drifts, Courts No Guiding Light, 65 AM. B. AsS'N J. 1468, 1468 (1979). 
13. Callies, Through a Glass, supra note 7, at 45. 
14. Id. at 45. 
15. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
16. See Callies, Through a Glass, supra note 7, at 45. 
17. In re Contested Case Hearing Re Conservation District Use Application (CDUA) HA-
3568 for the Thirty Meter Telescope at the Mauna Kea Science Reserve, Ka'ohe Mauka, 
Hamakua, Hawai'i, BLNR-CC-16-002 (Sept. 20, 2016), https:lldlnr.hawaii.gov/mklfllesl2016 
109ITMT-Doc-276-Notice-of-Contested-Case-Hearing.pdf. 
18. Indeed, the Court has accepted Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 
2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1262 (Mar. 5, 2018) (No. 17-647), for decision this term. 
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country, much thanks to some of the work being done by the 
Pacific Legal Foundation. And I suspect that it will increase. 
(8) Partial takings cases will be decided more on the merits but 
with mixed results.19 We're not getting a lot of partial tak-
ings cases, even though ripeness is, again, not as impor-
tant as it used to be. 
(10) And finally, the Court needs to and will resolve the so-called 
"relevant parcel" or denominator issue, both with respect 
to partial and total regulatory takings.20 We all know by 
now, with all the webinars and conferences dealing with 
it, the Supreme Court has decided the Murr case.21 You've 
got to watch what you wish for. We do have rules-sort 
of-and they are very strange. In the course of his opinion, 
Justice Kennedy managed to nearly drive a stake into the 
whole area of property rights, and I'm sure my colleagues 
will be talking about that at some length.22 
15 
So, thank you for your kind attention. It's a pleasure to be here. 
I have reserved two minutes for rebuttal. 
19. See Callies, Through a Glass, supra note 7, at 45. 
20. ld. 
2l. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). 
22. ld. at 1939-50. 
